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COMMENTS
THE INSIDERS: A LOOK AT THE COMPREHENSIVE AND
POTENTIALLY UNNECESSARY REGULATORY APPROACHES TO
INSIDER TRADING IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES,
INCLUDING THE SEC's NEWLY EFFECTIVE RULES 10b5-1 AND
10b5-2
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that Albert is the Vice President of Alpha, Inc., a
publicly-traded manufacturer of circuit board components, and
that Alpha will miss Wall Street's profit expectations for the
current fiscal quarter. Prior to public disclosure of the bad news,
Albert decides to sell a substantial portion of his Alpha holdings
and purchase put options1 for Alpha stock. Upon Alpha's public
disclosure of the bad news, the stock price drops ten percent.
After exercising his put options and selling a large portion of his
stock prior to the decrease in price, Albert manages to avoid
losing several hundred thousand dollars.
Assume further that Alpha is considering whether to acquire
Bull's Eye, a small, publicly-traded competitor that would
facilitate increased market share and economies of scale for
Alpha. In determining whether to make a tender offer2 for the
target company, Alpha hires Beta, Brown & Co., an investment
bank, to determine a price range for the tender offer. Prior to
Alpha's public disclosure of the tender offer, Sarah, a secretary at
Beta, learns of Alpha's plans to acquire Bull's Eye by examining
documents that her boss asked her to copy. A savvy trader with a
sizeable brokerage account, Sarah decides to purchase call
1. A put option enables the option holder to sell securities at a fixed price even if the
market price falls. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1121 (7th ed. 1999).
2. A tender offer is "[a] public offer to buy a minimum number of shares directly
from a corporation's shareholders at a fixed price, [usually] at a substantial premium over
the market price, in an effort to take control of the corporation." Id. at 1480.
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options3 and stock in Bull's Eye. Upon public disclosure of
Alpha's tender offer, Bull's Eye stock climbs dramatically in value.
Sarah exercises her call options for Bull's Eye stock and
immediately thereafter liquidates her entire position in Bull's Eye,
making a considerable sum of money.
Under U.S. and German insider trading4 regulations, would
Albert and Sarah be liable for trading based on inside
information? What effects might such trading, if permitted, have
on corporations, shareholders, and securities markets as a whole?
Are insider trading prohibitions the best way to counteract these
problems? What benefits might ensue from allowing insider
trading?
This Comment analyzes the preceding questions. Part II sets
forth U.S. insider trading regulations and explains why both
Albert and Sarah would face insider trading liability. Part III
describes the German economic landscape, the history of German
insider trading regulations, and current laws that would prohibit
Albert and Sarah from trading on inside information. Part IV
critically examines some of the arguments in favor of and against
deregulating insider trading. Part V briefly examines the
performance of German equity markets both prior to and after
the implementation of Germany's insider trading laws in 1994,
noting that these laws may not have necessarily been responsible
for improving German securities markets. Part VI concludes that
it might be most efficient to let individual corporations regulate
insider trading.
II. THE U.S. APPROACH TO INSIDER TRADING
The United States' insider trading regulations have
developed over the past century through statutory enactment,
common law interpretation, and regulatory promulgation.5 The
3. A call option enables the option holder to buy securities "at a fixed price even if
the market price rises." Id. at 1121.
4. Insider trading is "[t]he use of material, nonpublic information in trading the
shares of a company by a corporate insider or other person who owes a fiduciary duty to
the company." Id. at 798. Insider trading also includes trading on information that was
deceitfully acquired and properly belongs to persons to whom the trader owes a duty. Id.
5. Joseph T. McLaughlin & Margaret A. Helen Macfarlane, United States of
America, in INSIDER TRADING: THE LAWS OF EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
285 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 1992).
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regulations, however, are still "in a state of flux and
development."'6 The two-pronged prohibition involves a detailed
statutory scheme and creates, pursuant to the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).7 The SEC is a "regulatory body
empowered to oversee the conduct of securities transactions and
to promulgate regulations implementing the federal securities
laws."
Although U.S. securities laws do not define insider trading
per se, specific activities are prohibited for insiders9 and tippees.' 0
Under federal insider trading provisions, "buying or selling
securities when in the possession of material non-public
information pertaining to those securities" is prohibited. 1 The
U.S. Supreme Court has defined material information as any fact
that would assume "actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonable shareholder," or would be "viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information
made available."' 2 In addition to trading, "conveying material
non-public information to a second party for the purpose of
enabling that party to either trade in the relevant securities or to
tip yet another party" is also prohibited.
13
Violating the insider trading regulations may result in
criminal charges, injunctive relief, seizure of related profits,
monetary penalties, and/or private civil actions to recover
damages. 4 Additionally, corporate officers or directors who
violate insider trading laws may also breach fiduciary duties owed
to the corporation and its shareholders, opening the door to
shareholder derivative litigation.'
5
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. An insider is defined as "[a] person who has knowledge of facts not available to
the general public." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY, supra note 1, at 798.
10. A tippee is "[a] person who acquires material, nonpublic information from
someone in a fiduciary relationship with the company to which that information pertains."
Id. at 1492.
11. McLaughlin & Macfarlane, supra note 5, at 291.
12. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
13. McLaughlin & Macfarlane, supra note 5, at 291.
14. Teri E. O'Brien, Comment, Should a Possession or Use Standard Be Employed to
Prove Insider Trading?, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1999).
15. JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY
20011 459
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The precise parameters of the insider trading prohibitions
have been set forth by the courts in an effort to interpret the
statutes and regulations. 6 The following sections address the
liability that Albert and Sarah would face under section 10(b)
17 of
the Exchange Act, and Rules 10b-5,18  10b5-1,19  and 10b5-2
21
promulgated thereunder, which collectively comprise the main
body of U.S. insider trading law.
21
A. Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful to "use
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
. . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors." 22 Pursuant to its authority under
section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, prohibiting "the
making of misleading statements and fraudulent or deceitful
conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."23
35 (1991). A derivative action is a "suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of
action." WEST'S LAW AND COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY IN FIVE LANGUAGES:
DEFINITIONS OF THE LEGAL AND COMMERCIAL TERMS AND PHRASES OF AMERICAN,
ENGLISH, AND CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONs 451 (1985). Such an action is "based upon a
primary right of the corporation, but is asserted on its behalf by the stockholder because of
the corporation's failure, deliberate or otherwise, to act upon the primary right." Id.
16. McLaughlin & Macfarlane, supra note 5, at 291.
17. 15 U.S.C § 78j (1994).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).
19. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7881, 65
Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000).
20. Id.
21. McLaughlin & Macfarlane, supra note 5, at 291. There are also other important
sections and Rules in the Exchange Act. Section 16(b) "holds that any profits an insider
earns on purchases and sales that occur within six months of each other must be forfeited
to the corporation." STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 174
(1999). Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading on material, nonpublic information about a tender
offer when the trader knows or has reason to know that the information was obtained from
either the tender offeror or the target. 17 C.F.R § 240.14e-3 (1997). Section 20(d)
prohibits trading with respect to derivative securities to the same extent as trading in the
underlying securities themselves. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d) (1994). A derivative security is a
"volatile financial instrument whose value depends on or is derived from the performance
of a secondary source such as an underlying bond, currency, or commodity." BLACK'S
LAW DICTONARY, supra note 1, at 454.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
23. McLaughlin & Macfarlane, supra note 5, at 291-92.
460
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Neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5, however, "specifically
prohibits trading by insiders while possessing material non-public
information. 24  As a result, many commentators question
whether Congress intended to regulate insider trading under
section 10(b) at all.25 It has been asserted that instead of being
directed at insider trading, section 10(b) was crafted as a catch-all
provision that allowed the SEC, "under the watchful eye of the
federal courts, to prohibit 'manipulative or deceptive' conduct.,
26
Moreover, the history of the drafting and adoption of Rule 10b-5
"indicates that the provision was directed at various acts of market
manipulation by corporate insiders, not at insider trading per
se."27 The questionable breadth of Rule lOb-5, as it exists today,
was perhaps best articulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
described Rule 10b-5 as "a judicial oak which has grown from little
more than a legislative acorn."
28
Despite suspicion surrounding the key regulatory tools used
to combat insider trading, "case law clearly establishes that both
insider trading and tipping are prohibited under [section] 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5."29 In their efforts to construe these prohibitions,
courts have relied on a view that insider trading involves some sort
of deception directed either "at the other party to the transaction
who does not know the material information," or "at the
corporation whose confidential information is improperly
utilized. 30
1. Theories of Liability
Courts have adopted two theories under which section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 insider trading liability arises: the "classical
24. Id. at 292.
25. See Richard W. Painter et al., Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United
States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REv. 153, 160-61 (1998).
26. Id. at 161 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980)).
27. Id. at 160 n.29 (citing Milton V. Freeman, Remarks at the Conference on
Codification of Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793,921-23 (1967)).
28. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). In reference to
the private cause of action available under Rule 10b-5, Justice Rehnquist also stated that
"it would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the [SEC] in 1942
foreordained the present state of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5." Id.
29. McLaughlin & Macfarlane, supra note 5, at 292.
30. Id.
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theory" and the "misappropriation theory.",31  Under these
theories, both Albert and Sarah would be liable for insider trading
violations.
a. The Classical Theory
The classical theory of insider trading asserts that a corporate
insider violates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he or she
"trades in the securities of his own corporation with the aid of
material, nonpublic information gained through his position in the
corporation. 32 The classical theory is most often used to convict
officers, directors, or other insiders who trade stock in the
corporation for which they work.33 Courts have also used the
classical theory to prosecute people who are not company
employees, but nonetheless work on the firm's behalf.34 Such
persons, deemed "temporary insiders," often include accountants,
lawyers, and business consultants.35
Under the classical theory, Albert, a corporate insider, would
be required to either disclose the bad news about Alpha's
quarterly profits to the market or forgo trading in Alpha stock.36
The duty to disclose or abstain rests on two principal elements:
first, the existence of Albert's relationship with Alpha, which
provided "access to non-public information intended to be used
only for corporate purposes" and second, the "inherent unfairness
involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing."
37
Albert's trading is regarded as the "use of a deceptive
device," as described in section 10(b), because it is deemed to
breach the relationship of trust and confidence existing between
the shareholders of a corporation and corporate insiders who
obtain inside information due to their positions within the
31. Id.
32. Michael A. Snyder, United States v. O'Hagan, the Supreme Court and the
Misappropriation Theory of Securities Fraud and Insider Trading: Clarification or
Confusion?, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 419, 421 (1999).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See McLaughlin & Macfarlane, supra note 5, at 292.
37. Id. (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968)).
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corporation.38 Note, however, that under the classical theory,
Sarah would not be liable. Because she is not an Alpha insider,
Sarah has not traded in the stock of the company for which she
works, and would thus stand outside the scope of the classical
theory.
i. The Use v. Possession Argument
What if Albert, in selling Alpha stock and buying put options,
merely possessed inside information but did not use it as an actual
basis for the trades? For years, the lower federal courts were split
on this issue.39 While the Ninth Circuit required actual use of the
information at the time of the trade,4 ° the Second Circuit held that
mere possession of material nonpublic information was sufficient
to uphold an insider trading conviction.41 Possession of material
nonpublic information, the Second Circuit reasoned, "[u]nlike a
loaded weapon which may stand ready but unused ... can not lay
idle in the human brain."'42 An insider's mere possession of
material nonpublic information thus "taints a subsequent trade
and renders it illegal, regardless of the insider's subjective
motivation at the time the trade was executed., 43  The Eleventh
Circuit took an entirely different approach, holding that trading
while in possession of inside information created a rebuttable
presumption of liability.'
ii. Rule 10b5-1 as a Solution to the "Use v. Possession" Debate
Due to the uncertainty of whether actual use or mere
possession was required for liability under the classical theory, the
SEC enacted Rule 10b5-1 to ensure that the lower of the two
38. Snyder, supra note 32, at 421 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228
(1980)).
39. Paul Beckett, Ruling Delivers a Blow to Efforts by SEC to Fight Insider Trading,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1998, at B10. "The issue may ultimately be decided by the Supreme
Court because the [United States v. Smith] ruling directly conflicts with a 1993 decision by
a federal appeals court in New York." Id.
40. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998).
41. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1993).
42. Id. at 120.
43. O'Brien, supra note 14, at 1091 (citing Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120).
44. SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998). Under this approach, the
insider could rebut liability by showing that he or she did not use the information in
conducting the trade. Id.
2001]
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thresholds would be used.45  Rule 10b5-1, effective October 23,
2000,46 adopts a general rule that any purchase or sale of stock
while in possession of material inside information is illegal,
without regard to whether the information was a motivating factor
in making the trade.47 The rule therefore abolishes the distinction
between use and possession, increasing the risks for executives
like Albert who sell stock at a time when they arguably know
material undisclosed information, regardless of whether they buy
or sell for completely unrelated reasons.48
b. The Misappropriation Theory
As an alternative to the classical theory, the misappropriation
theory asserts that corporate outsiders
who are not subject to liability under the classical theory may,
nonetheless, violate the broad anti-fraud provisions of section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 if they: (1) obtain nonpublic information
through breach of a fiduciary duty or similar duty arising from a
relationship of trust and confidence owed to the rightful
possessor of the information; and (2) trade on the basis of that
information.
49
The misappropriation theory was designed to impose liability in
circumstances similar to Sarah's-where an individual is entrusted
with confidential information and then uses that information to
trade in the corporation's stock.50
45. See Shirli Fabbri Weiss & Susan D. Resley, Corporate Policies on Compliance
With Insider Trading Law and New SEC Rules lob5-1 and 10b5-2, at
http://www.graycary.com/artices/secsecsumOO_2.html#new (last visited Feb. 14, 2001).
46. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7881, 65
Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000).
47. The SEC Adopts Rules to Regulate How Public Companies Deal With Analysts
And Insider Trading, SEC. L. ALERT (Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, LLP), Aug. 2000, at
1-3 [hereinafter Brobeck]. Rule 10b5-1(c) does create affirmative defenses to trading on
the use of inside information, which center around the insider maintaining documentation
of a pre-existing plan to trade. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-7881, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,728 (Aug. 24, 2000).
48. Brobeck, supra note 47, at 3.
49. Benjamin D. Briggs, Comment, United States v. O'Hagan: The Supreme Court
Validates the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading and Rule 14e-3(a), but Does the
Court's Decision Help or Hinder the Quest for Guiding Principles?, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
459, 470 (1998).
50. See McLaughlin & Macfarlane, supra note 5, at 293-94. Under the circumstances
of the hypothetical presented, Sarah would also face insider trading liability under Rule
[Vol. 23:457
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Unlike the classical theory, the misappropriation theory does
not depend upon a duty to "the shareholders of the company in
whose shares the misappropriator trades." 51  Under the
misappropriation theory, "fraud occurs only when an individual
deceives the person who entrusted the individual with material,
nonpublic information., 52  The person's mere "possession of
nonpublic information alone is not enough. 53
Despite arguments that Rule 10b-5 does not support the
misappropriation theory because it was enacted to protect
investors rather than a company's rights to its information,5 4 the
U.S. Supreme Court nonetheless adopted the misappropriation
theory in 1997.55 In doing so, however, the Court failed to define
the precise scope of fiduciary duty needed to give rise to liability.56
For instance, while it was clear that the duty encompassed the
relationship between a lawyer or accountant and a client,
uncertainty existed as to whether such a duty arose in
relationships of lower fiduciary caliber, such as a close friend or
computer-repair person entrusted with corporate secrets.
57
. Rule 10b5-2 and the Misappropriation Theory
The SEC adopted Rule 10b5-2 to clarify the ambiguities
surrounding the misappropriation theory.58 Effective October 23,
2000,59 Rule 10b5-2 enumerates three non-exclusive elements for
determining when a person receiving material nonpublic
information is subject to a "duty of trust or confidence" for
purposes of the misappropriation theory: (1) whenever the
recipient agrees to maintain the information in confidence; (2)
14e-3. See discussion supra note 21.
51. Briggs, supra note 49, at 470-71.
52. Id. at 471.
53. Id.
54. Milton V. Freeman, Colloquium Foreword, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S1, S4-S5
(1993). Milton Freeman, who participated in the drafting of Rule lOb-5 and is often called
the "father of Rule 10b-5," went so far as to argue before a Senate Committee that
construction of Rule 10b-5 to support the misappropriation theory was inappropriate
because it extended beyond the Rule's original intent. Id. at S3-S5.
55. See O'Hagan v. United States, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
56. Painter et al., supra note 25, at 175-76.
57. Id. at 177.
58. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7881, 65
Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000).
59. Id.
20011
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whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic
information and the recipient have a history, pattern, or practice
of sharing confidences that results in a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality; or (3) whenever the person who provided the
information was a spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the person
receiving the information, unless it can be shown that no
reasonable expectation of confidentiality existed between the
parties. 6° Rule 10b5-2 thus expands the Supreme Court's fiduciary
duty requirement for insider trading liability under the
misappropriation theory and would impose liability on Sarah even
if she learned of the confidential information merely because she
was, for example, Albert's psychologist.
2. Section 10(b) and the Requirement of Scienter
Courts have ruled that because the language of section 10(b)
sets forth an element of deception or dishonesty, proof of scienter,
or willful violation, is required. 61 Accordingly, the courts have
held that Rule 10b-5 does not prohibit negligent conduct.62 Some
courts, however, have considered the scienter requirement to
encompass reckless conduct as well as intentional conduct.63
3. Tipper and Tippee Liability
Section 10(b2 prohibits tipping by insiders to the same extent
as direct trading. If Albert had tipped the bad news of quarterly
profits to a friend of his who had no fiduciary duty to Albert or
Alpha, Inc., section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would prohibit the
friend from trading in Alpha stock if: (1) he received the
information by virtue of Albert's breach of fiduciary duty; (2) the
friend knew or should have known of Albert's breach of fiduciary
duty; and (3) Albert received a direct or indirect personal benefit
by providing the information to the friend.65 The friend's liability
60. Id.
61. McLaughlin & Macfarlane, supra note 5, at 295.
62. Id. (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)).
63. McLaughlin & Macfarlane, supra note 5, at 295.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660-64 (1983); Shapiro v. Merl Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1974)).
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under such circumstances arises "from his role as a participant
after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty."
66
B. Summary
An overview of U.S. insider trading laws reveals that they are
indeed comprehensive. The number of convictions attained each
year by the SEC alone illustrates the regulations' effectiveness at
curtailing insider trading.67  Due to ambiguities surrounding the
legislative history of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, however, it is
unclear whether Congress and the SEC initially intended for the
judiciary and the SEC68 to expand U.S. insider trading laws to
their current breadth.
III. THE GERMAN APPROACH
In contrast to the United States, which has historically
regulated insider trading via a general anti-fraud provision, the
German insider trading laws take root in a stronger statutory
base.69  The German regulations, as a result, depend less on
judicial interpretation.7" The ability of the German legislature to
avoid the pitfalls of the judiciary may have been enhanced by
Germany's delay in regulating insider trading.7 This, in turn, may
have allowed Germany to learn from the performance of the U.S
regulations.72 Before delving into the current state of German
insider trading laws, a brief background of insider trading and its
regulation in Germany is helpful.
66. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
67. See Anita Raghavan et al., Insider Trading: This Crime Begets Little Punishment,
WALL ST. J. EUR., Aug. 17, 2000, at Al. Between the years of 1995 and 1999 alone, "the
SEC won 162 civil cases against 270 defendants accused of insider trading, and ordered the
disgorgement of [over $40 million] in illicit trading profits." Id.
68 See discussion supra note 54 and accompanying text. The SEC's recent enactment of
Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 clearly underscores the SEC's support of broadening U.S. insider
trading regulations. This effort, however, directly conflicts with the opinions of Milton
Freeman (the "father of Rule 10b-5"), who believes that Rule 10b-5 has been expanded
beyond its intended scope. See discussion supra note 54 and accompanying text.
69. Daniel James Standen, Insider Trading Reforms Sweep Across Germany: Bracing
for the Cold Winds of Change, 36 HARv. INT'L L.J. 177, 184 (1995).
70. See id. at 184, 206.
71. See id.; see also James H. Freis, Jr., An Outsider's Look Into the Regulation of
Insider Trading in Germany: A Guide to Securities, Banking, and Market Reform in
Finanzplatz Deutschland, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 83 (1996).
72. Freis, supra note 71, at 83.
2001]
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A. The History of Insider Trading in Germany
Throughout history, Germans have viewed insider trading
with far less disdain than Americans.73 Whereas U.S. insider
trading regulations have been effective since 1934, Germans were
able to use insider trading as an unpunishable means of securing
large profits through most of this century.
74
Prior to Germany's enactment of the Second Financial
Markets Promotion Act (Promotion Act)75 in 1994, German
business culture consisted of intertwined relationships between
companies, banks, analysts, and journalists.76 Inside information
was frequently relayed between these groups at so-called "fireside
chats," where companies shared information about their
businesses with a select few.77  Trading based on inside
information in Germany was so common that one German banker
quipped that it was a real "joke" to watch stock prices move
before news was released to the public.78
Germany's laissez-faire approach to insider trading was
largely due to the structure of business organizations within the
country.79 Because of a pervasive German sentiment that
government involvement in business should be avoided, the
majority of German companies opted to remain privately-held.80
Moreover, German companies relied heavily on debt financing
from banks, and as a result did not need to use stock markets as a
source of capital.81
Another factor contributing to Germany's laissez-faire
approach to insider trading was the country's legal restrictions.82
Prior to 1994, insider trading was made illegal only when a
73. See Standen, supra note 69, at 184; see also Ursula C. Pfeil, Comment, Finanzplatz
Deutschland: Germany Enacts Insider Trading Legislation, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
137, 139 (1996).
74. Pfeil, supra note 73, at 139.
75. Zweites Finanzmarktfbrderungsgesetz, 1994 (BGB1. I S.1749) (F.R.G.)
[hereinafter Promotion Act].
76. Pfeil, supra note 73, at 139.
77. Id. (citing John Templeman & Bill Javetski, Achtung! Insider Trading Is a Crime,
Bus. WK., Dec. 5, 1994, at 54).
78. Id.
79. Standen, supra note 69, at 191.
80. Id. at 192; see also Pfeil, supra note 73, at 147 n.58.
81. Standen, supra note 69, at 192.
82. Id. at 191.
[Vol. 23:457
Insider Trading in the U.S. & Germany
company voluntarily adhered to Germany's Insider Trading
Guidelines (Guidelines), 83  which operated more like a
gentleman's agreement than a law.84 Despite adoption of the
Guidelines by a majority of German corporations by 1992, few
insider trading investigations were conducted and conclusive
findings of insider trading were extremely scarce.8 5
B. Reasons and Incentives for Changing the Insider Trading Laws
in Germany
Amidst growing international competition, German
legislators adopted new insider trading legislation to preserve
Frankfurt's status as a leading financial market center of
continental Europe.86 In the year before enactment of the new
legislation, this competition grew quite fierce.87 In 1993, Germany
received less than $3 billion of the $68 billion that U.S. investors
placed in foreign equities.88
While many banking and business professionals believed that
the presence of and harms associated with insider trading were
minimal,89 some viewed the enactment of insider trading
legislation as a key strategy for strengthening investor confidence
and fostering the competitiveness of German capital markets. 90
Giving rise to the latter belief were numerous highly-publicized
insider trading scandals that some felt eroded domestic and
foreign confidence in German securities markets. 91
83. See Insiderhandels-Richtlinien [Insider Trading Rules], translated in Gerhard
Wegen, Congratulations From Your Continental Cousins, 10b-5: Securities Fraud
Regulation from the European Perspective, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S57, S81 (1993).
84. Pfeil, supra note 73, at 141. The Guidelines were "comparable to a so-called
gentleman's agreement or a moral code in that they were binding only on those persons
who voluntarily submitted to them by private contract." Id.
85. Id. at 142 (citing HAROLD'S. BLOOMENTHAL & EBERHARD ROHM,
INTERNATIONAL CAPrrAL MARKETS AND SECURMES REGULATION § 8C.11 (Clark
Boardman Callaghan ed., 1992); Sweeping Out the Stables, ECONOMIST, Aug. 31, 1991, at
15; Silvia Ascarelli, Insider Trade is Now a Crime in Germany, WALL ST. J. EUR., Aug. 1,
1994, at 9).
86. Pfeil, supra note 73, at 145.
87. See Andrew Fisher, Frankfurt Brushes up its Act, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1994, at 16.
88. See id.
89. See Hans-Bemd Schafer & Claus Ott, Economic Effects of EEC Insider Trading
Regulation Applied to Germany, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 357,360 (1992).
90. Pfeil, supra note 73, at 146.
91. Id. at 145; see also id. at 139 n.12 (describing one of Germany's largest insider
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Enactment of Germany's new legislation was also a response
to intense pressure from the European Community that urged
harmonization of the European capital markets through increased
transparency, strengthening of investors' rights, and heightened
regulation of securities transactions.92 On November 13, 1989, the
Council of European Communities issued a European
Community Directive requiring European member states to
promulgate insider trading regulations by June 1, 1992.93 After
Germany's initial failure to comply with the deadline, and the
European Commission's subsequent institution of infringement
proceedings, Germany finally adopted the Promotion Act on July
8, 1994. 94 In so doing, Germany became the last European
Community member state to prohibit insider trading.95
C. Current German Insider Trading Regulations
The scope of the insider trading prohibition under the
Promotion Act is set forth in the Act's definitions of three key
concepts: (1) the insider, (2) insider information, and (3) insider
transactions.96  In order to be convicted of insider trading, all
three criteria must be satisfied. 97
1. Insiders
The Promotion Act classifies two types of insiders: primary
and secondary.98 Primary insiders are specifically defined as
persons having access to and knowledge of nonpublic information
by virtue of status as a manager, director, or employee of the
corporation or a controlling company; as a controlling
shareholder; or by means of a professional relationship with the
corporation.
99
trading scandals where traders and brokers pocketed nearly $63 billion).
92. Id. at 147-48; Freis, supra note 71, at 11-12.
93. Council Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing 89/592, art. 14,
1989 O.J. (L 334) 30.
94. Pfeil, supra note 73, at 149.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 155.
97. See Promotion Act §§ 12, 13, 14, translated in GERMAN CAPITAL MARKET LAW
45-46 (Ulf R. Siebel et al. eds., 1995).
98. Id. §§ 13, 14, at 45-46.
99. Id. § 13, at 45.
[Vol. 23:457
Insider Trading in the U.S. & Germany
Albert would fall under the definition of a primary insider
because he received information about Alpha through his position
as a manager within the company. Sarah, on the other hand,
would be classified as a secondary insider, which the Promotion
Act defines as any third party having knowledge of insider
information.1"' In this respect, the definition of secondary insider
serves as a catchall provision and encompasses any non-primary
insider that holds insider information.
10 1
2. Inside Information
In order for information to constitute "inside information,"
the Promotion Act requires that the information be (a) nonpublic;
(b) pertain either to one or several issuers of securities publicly
traded on a German or other European Union member state
stock exchange, or pertain to such securities or derivatives' °2 for
such securities themselves; and (c) be likely to have a significant
effect on the price of the security to which it pertains if the
information were publicly known. 10 3 The Promotion Act does not
require that nonpublic information be material or contain any
indicia of trustworthiness. 10 4 An unsubstantiated and immaterial
rumor, therefore, while not qualifying as inside information in the
United States, would be deemed as such in Germany.
While the definition of "likely to have a significant effect on
the price"'1 5 of a security seems equally as ambiguous as the term
"materiality" 6 to the stock price, the German standard seems to
create a higher threshold than that of the United States."° Not all
material information would necessarily be capable of significantly
affecting a stock's price.'0" For instance, while Alpha's bad news
about quarterly profits would be deemed "material" in the United
100. Id § 14, at 46.
101. See id.
102. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
103. Promotion Act §§ 12, 13, translated in GERMAN CAPrrAL MARKET LAW, supra
note 97, at 45. The Financial Markets Act also prohibits insider trading with respect to
derivatives. Id.
104. Pfeil, supra note 73, at 159.
105. Promotion Act § 13, translated in GERMAN CAPITAL MARKET LAW, supra note
97, at 45.
106. See discussion infra Part H.
107. See Freis, supra note 71, at 92.
108. See id.
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States, it is uncertain whether, if disclosed, it would change
Alpha's stock price "significantly."' 9  This question centers
around what standard is employed when defining a "significant"
change. Would a two percent fluctuation in price suffice?
Twenty percent? In this regard, the law is somewhat vague." ° In
addition, it is important to note that the German standard for
inside information seems to rely heavily upon the market's
reaction to information."' Whereas with respect to one company
the disclosure of information may not cause a dramatic change in
price, such information pertaining to another company may cause
the public to overreact, at which point the price would change
significantly." 2 The German standard thus seems to require
companies to predict how investors will react to certain
information, making it difficult for companies to determine
precisely what information must be disclosed to the market." 3
3. Insider Transactions
With respect to the Promotion Act's definition of "insider
transactions," separate prohibitions are created for primary and
secondary insiders." 4 In making this distinction, the law achieves
a result similar to the distinctions between the United States'
classical and misappropriation theories of liability. Like the
classical theory, German law "prohibits primary insiders [(such as
Albert)] from taking advantage of their knowledge of insider
information to acquire or dispose of insider securities for
themselves or others."" 5  In addition, primary insiders are
prohibited from tipping or "making available any insider
information to another without authorization. '"116
109. See Promotion Act § 13, translated in GERMAN CAPITAL MARKET LAW, supra
note 97, at 45.
110. See id.; see also Tony Hickinbotham & Christoph Vaupel, Germany, in
INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING 144 (Mark Stamp & Carson Welsh eds., 1996).
111. Hickinbotham & Vaupel, supra note 110, at 144.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See Promotion Act § 14(2), translated in GERMAN CAPITAL MARKET LAW, supra
note 97, at 46.
115. Pfeil, supra note 73, at 162-63 (citing Promotion Act § 14).
116. Promotion Act § 14(1)2, translated in GERMAN CAPITAL MARKET LAW, supra
note 97, at 46.
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Secondary insiders are prohibited only from using inside
information to buy or sell securities for themselves or others. 7
As such, secondary insiders may tip information to others." 8
With respect to secondary insiders, the German prohibition is
quite similar to the United States' misappropriation theory in that
it prevents people "outside" the corporation from trading on
inside information. 119 The German definition of a secondary
insider, however, spans even further than the breadth of Rule
10b5-2. Whereas Rule 10b5-2, at its outer perimeter, encompasses
relationships exhibiting a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality, the German definition of a secondary insider
prohibits any third party having knowledge of inside information
from trading, regardless of whether an expectation of confidence
was reasonable at the time the third party received the
information. 2 ' The scope of the German regulations thus
prohibits insider trading not only by individuals such as Sarah,
who received the information in confidence, but also by third
parties such as a friendly office visitor, who accidentally stumbled
upon the inside information on her way to the coffee machine.
D. Punishment
Failure to comply with the Promotion Act's insider trading
regulations is punishable by up to five years in prison or the
imposition of fines.' 2' Unlike the U.S. approach, however, the
Promotion Act does not provide for civil sanctions.122  Civil suits
are often an effective remedy for individuals claiming to be
harmed by insider trading because such suits generally require a
lower standard of proof.123 Moreover, the Promotion Act does
117. Id. §14(2), at 46.
118. See id.; see also Standen, supra note 69, at 205.
119. See Promotion Act § 14(2), translated in GERMAN CAPITAL MARKET LAW, supra
note 97, at 46.
120. See id.
121. Standen, supra note 69, at 204.
122. Id.
123. Id. Whereas criminal cases typically require a showing of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, civil cases use a preponderance of the evidence standard. Thomas C.
Newkirk & Melissa A. Robertson, Speech by SEC Staff. Insider Trading-A U.S.
Perspective, at http:llwww.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2001) [hereinafter SEC Staff Speech]. Because most insider trading cases
involve only circumstantial evidence (unless the defendant confesses to knowledge of
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not provide for claims by shareholders or contemporaneous
traders.124 The Promotion Act's enforcement mechanisms and
ability to deter insider trading may thus be weaker than analogous
measures in the United States. 25
E. Summary
German insider trading prohibitions are quite expansive with
respect to their coverage of insiders, inside information, and
insider transactions. 26 While the scope of the German approach
to corporate "outsiders" seems to reach beyond that of the United
States, the ability of German regulations to serve as an effective
deterrent may be somewhat limited due to their exclusion of civil
and shareholder derivative suits as remedies for violations. 127
IV. SHOULD INSIDER TRADING BE PERMITTED?
Given the expansive breadth of U.S. and German insider
trading laws, this Comment explores whether insider trading
regulations are truly necessary. Insider trading prohibitions are
not cheap. 128 Regulatory bodies and law enforcement agencies
expend vast resources to detect and prosecute inside traders. 29
Similarly, courts must devote considerable judicial resources to
convict perpetrators. 3 ° Once convicted, a trader's life can be
devastated due to prison time, actions for damages, and public
stigma.' 3'
The deregulation of insider trading has been debated for
decades. 32 While both sides of the argument have strong points,
each position likewise has its weaknesses. This section analyzes
insider trading in some admissible form), meeting the standard in a criminal context is
often onerous. Id.
124. Standen, supra note 69, at 204-05.
125. See id.
126. Pfeil, supra note 73, at 163.
127. See Standen, supra note 69, at 204-05.
128. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 21, at 125.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 125-26 (noting that the debate arose in the 1960s with the publishing of
Professor Henry Manne's book, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966),
which asserted that insider trading should be permitted because it promotes market
efficiency and creates efficient incentives for corporate managers).
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some of the harms associated with insider trading and several of
the potential benefits that might ensue if insider trading was
permitted.
A. Harms Associated with Insider Trading
1. Impeding Efficient Management, Moral Hazards, and Short
Selling
Insider trading may be harmful because it creates a moral
hazard by allowing corporate managers to profit on bad news as
well as good.133 Insider trading enables managers to profit on
good news by buying the company's stock prior to disclosure of
the news.134 Upon disclosure, the stock's price typically rises to
reflect the good news, at which point the manager could sell the
shares for more than what was paid. 35 Similarly, insider trading
can be used by managers prior to disclosure of bad news to either
avoid losses by selling existing positions, or earn money by selling
short. 36 Permitting insiders to profit on bad information in this
fashion may, at the extreme, make "managers indifferent between
working to make the firm prosperous and working to make it
bankrupt.' 37
This problem is especially pronounced if short selling is
permitted.138  Banning short selling would therefore largely
alleviate the moral hazard problem. 139 Even where short selling is
permitted, however, several factors exist to counteract incentives
for managers to run the firm into the ground. 4 °
First, managers intentionally causing the firm's stock price to
fall so that they can reap insider trading profits would be in clear
133. MACEY, supra note 15, at 34.
134. Id. at 35.
135. See id. at 10.
136. A short sale is the sale of a security that the seller does not own in expectation
that the price will fall, whereupon the seller buys the security for less than he sold it for
and returns the shares to the person from whom he borrowed them. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1339.
137. Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REv. 857, 873 (1983).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. MACEY, supra note 15, at 34-36.
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breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty to their firm.14' The threat
of a potential shareholder derivative suit may thus dissuade
managers from taking such actions. 42 Also, because managers
work in teams, the efforts of one manager to make the firm
bankrupt will most likely be thwarted by other managers on the
team. 43 These other managers will be too concerned with losing
their compensation packages and tarnishing their reputations to
let one manager ruin it for them by creating bad news.'"
The final problem with the moral hazard argument is that it
fails to acknowledge the economic disincentives that managers
face if they try to bankrupt the firm.145 In order for a manager to
willfully make poor management decisions that lead to a decline in
stock price, the profits from a particular short sale must exceed the
present value of the manager's entire compensation package. 146 If
such profits are not attainable with reasonable certainty, the
insider will forgo the transaction for fear that he or she will be
fired and lose the entire package. 47 Therefore, with respect to
short selling, a manager would have to put a great deal on the line
for the payoff from making the firm bankrupt to be worth his or
her while.
Aside from these disincentives to abuse short selling, insider
trading in the form of short selling may in fact be beneficial where
managers use it to hedge 48 against risky projects. 49 Ordinarily,
managers are risk averse with regard to new projects because they
fear being blamed for failure.150  Such risk aversion is not
141. Id. at 35.
142. See id.
143. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 873-74.
144. See id. at 874.
145. MACEY, supra note 15, at 34.
146. Id. Managerial compensation packages typically include salary, stock options,
deferred compensation such as pensions and annuities, and other perquisites. Id. Prestige
and standing within managers' communities that occur as a result of positions held within
the firm also factor into this analysis. Id.
147. See id. at 34-35.
148. A hedge is the making of "advance arrangements to safeguard oneself from loss
on an investment, speculation, or bet, as when a buyer of commodities insures against
unfavorable price changes by buying in advance at a fixed rate for later delivery."
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY, supra note 1, at 726.
149. MACEY, supra note 15, at 33.
150. Id.
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beneficial to shareholders.1 5 ' Unlike bondholders, who have fixed
claims on the firm's assets, shareholders are residual claimants
who are entitled to all of the firm's gains resulting from successful
projects. 52 Moreover, shareholders want managers to take risks
because shareholders can insulate themselves from firm-specific
risks by holding a diversified portfolio or mutual fund. 153 Because
short selling allows managers to profit from projects that initially
appear optimal but end up failing, it may effectively alter the risk
preferences of management, making them more like those of the
shareholders .154
2. Insider Trading Interferes with Information Disclosure
Another argument against insider trading is that it may
motivate managers to delay disclosure of information so that they
have ample time to trade in the company's stock. 55 Alternatively,
because an insider's ability to profit depends on information
reaching the market, insider trading may, in some instances, result
in premature disclosure. 5 6  Either way, insider trading may
motivate managers to release information at times that are
profitable for them, rather than the firm.
3. Fairness Arguments and Market Confidence
One of the most common arguments against insider trading is
that it is unfair or immoral.'57 This belief is so prevalent that
many commentators have argued that insider trading should be
prohibited regardless of whether or not it is efficient. 58 Such
critics also assert that the unfairness resulting from insider trading
creates an uneven playing field amongst traders and erodes
market liquidity. 159 This belief is espoused by Arthur Levitt,
151. Id. at 32-33.
152. Id. at 32.
153. Id. at 33. A mutual fund is an investment operated by a company that invests its
shareholders' money in a selection of securities that is usually diversified. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1040.
154. MACEY, supra note 15, at 33; see also Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 872.
155. LEwis D. SOLOMON ET AL, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS 911 (3d ed. 1994).
156. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 879.
157. Id. at 880.
158. Id. at 880-81.
159. MACEY, supra note 15, at 41-44.
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former Chairman of the SEC, who asserts that "[the U.S.] markets
are a success precisely because they enjoy the world's highest level
of confidence. Investors put their capital to work-and put their
fortunes at risk [in the U.S. securities markets] -because they
trust that the marketplace is honest."160
Evidence from Germany may tend to illustrate that insider
trading undermines investor confidence. 161  Because insider
trading was common in Germany prior to 1994, and because the
majority of publicly traded stock was held by institutional
investors, many believed that the stock market was "slanted in
favor of large, sophisticated traders."'162  This perception
materialized into a stock ownership rate of only seven percent
amongst German adults in 1993, whereas in the United States,
thirty-five percent of adults owned stock. 63
Insider trading, however, may not be the sole reason that
individual investor participation in German securities markets was
low.' 64  Many attributed this problem to high transaction costs,
expensive stock prices, and a lack of transparency in the securities
markets due to lenient reporting and disclosure requirements.
65
Moreover, the unfairness and market confidence arguments are
refuted strongly by countries like Japan, 66 where securities
markets and liquidity have historically flourished regardless of
rampant insider trading.
67
The unfairness argument is rebutted largely by the
proposition that if investors know that insider trading occurs, they
will not be disadvantaged because they will discount security
prices to accurately reflect the risk of insider trading. 68 This
discount enables investors to "self-insure" against the risk of
160. SEC Staff Speech, supra note 123.
161. See Standen, supra note 69, at 193.
162. Id. at 192-93; see discussion supra Part lII.A.
163. Id. at 193 (citing Glenn Whitney, Europe Moves to Curb Insider Trading, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 4, 1993, at All).
164. See GERMAN CAPITAL MARKET LAW, supra note 97, at 8.
165. Id.
166. MACEY, supra note 15, at 44. Japan's insider trading laws lacked enforcement for
many years. Id. See also discussion infra Part IV.B.3. Despite Japan being known as an
"insider's paradise," the Japanese capital markets did not suffer any "crisis in confidence."
MACEY, supra note 15, at 44.
167. MACEY, supra note 15, at 44.
168. See SOLOMON ET AL, supra note 155, at 912.
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insider trading, thereby making the price that the investor pays
fair.169 Additionally, if insider trading is an efficient compensation
scheme, then profits of firms that permit insider trading should
increase, thereby benefiting insiders and outside investors alike.
170
B. The Potential Benefits of Permitting Insider Trading
1. Insider Trading May Be an Efficient Compensation Scheme
Because managers are risk averse, they may not choose the
most lucrative investment projects for the firm for fear that they
will be blamed for failure. 7' A dilemma thus exists as to how
firms should properly motivate managers to take risks. 17 2 Due to
the difficulty in valuing an innovation prior to its creation and
execution, employment agreements entered into before a
managerial innovation will fail to properly reward managers who
do take chances.
173
Renegotiating a manager's contract after an innovation,
however, presents high transaction costs and can result in
managers employing strategic behavior in the negotiations. 74
Insider trading, if used as a substitute for contract renegotiations,
can alleviate costs associated with renegotiating by allowing the
manager to alter his compensation with each trade.1 75 "[B]ecause
managers themselves determine the frequency of the
'renegotiations,' they can tailor their compensation scheme to
their particular attitudes toward risk.' 76 In addition, rewarding
managers by allowing them to trade on inside information may be
efficient where it provides better "incentive[s] to acquire and
develop valuable information.' 77
169. Id.; MACEY, supra note 15, at 25.
170. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 881.
171. MACEY, supra note 15, at 33.
172. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 869.
173. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 133
(1966); see also Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 869-71.
174. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 21, at 137.
175. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 870.
176. Id. at 871.
177. Id.
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Insider trading, however, is not a perfectly efficient means of
compensating managers.178 Due to the unfettered ability of an
insider to buy shares in the market, a unique situation is created.
Unlike stock option grants, 179 which are allotted to employees in
quantities relative to their potential contribution to the firm, the
allocation of shares to an inside trader depends entirely on how
many shares he or she can afford to buy.180 Insider trading thus
rewards managers disproportionately based on their own wealth
rather than on the value of their innovations. 81 In addition,
because information can spread to other managers and employees
within a firm, these individuals may benefit by trading on
information without having contributed to its production.
1 82
No compensation scheme, however, is flawless.' 8 3 Even stock
option plans have their inefficiencies."8  For example,
"[m]anagers may profit from a stock option plan.., because of an
upturn in the [stock] market as a whole" rather than a price
increase generated by management's own productivity. 85
Moreover, the stock might reach the same price with or without
the incentive effects created by a stock option plan. 86 In this
respect, insider trading may be no less efficient than other
compensation schemes.
2. Insider Trading as a Significant Form of Information
Disclosure
Information disclosure by firms is important because it
promotes accurate stock prices and reduces investor uncertainty
about individual companies. 187 If a firm does not supply relevant
information to the market, investors may "assume the worst and
discount the amount they are willing to pay for that firm's shares
178. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 21, at 138-39.
179. A stock option with respect to compensation is an "option that allows a corporate
employee to buy shares of corporate stock at a fixed price or within a fixed period."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1431.
180. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 21, at 138.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 878.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 21, at 128-29.
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to compensate [them] for the uncertainty." '188 Corporations are
therefore motivated to distinguish themselves from other firms
that fall victim to negative market speculation.189 Through the
production of information that is either positive, or less negative
than the public speculates, traders will be willing to pay a higher
price for the firm's shares than if no such disclosure was made.
190
Information disclosure, whether through press releases or via
insider trading, also enables firms to better observe when
corporate managers are performing successfully. 191 Where the
stock market reflects all available information, a high stock price
generally tends to indicate that management is doing a good
job.
192
Complete disclosure of all information via press releases or
otherwise, however, is not optimal. 193 Disclosure is costly, and at
some point the costs of increased disclosure outweigh its
benefits. 94 In some cases, disclosure may even destroy the
information's value. 195 For instance, an investor would not want
his company to disclose confidential information regarding the
presence of valuable mineral ore deposits on land the company
intended to purchase. 96 This disclosure might result in a
competitor bidding up the price of the land or even buying the
land itself, thereby harming the investor's firm.
197
188. MACEY, supra note 15, at 46; see also Eric Moskowitz, Propaganda Dot Corn:
Companies Are Increasingly Using the Internet to Manipulate Their Own Stocks-and
You, RED HERRING, Nov. 13, 2000, at 266. The importance of information disclosure was
recently illustrated by the Chief Executive Officer of the publicly-traded Track Data, Inc.,
who stated, "I want to apologize to our faithful stockholders who are looking each morning
for our latest corporate developments. Rest assured that we do not take this lack of news
lightly." Id.
189. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 867.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. See id. Extrinsic market factors such as interest rates, consumer confidence,
mania, etc., can potentially inflate stock prices even when management is not performing
successfully and corporate earnings are poor. See Thomas S. Mulligan & Tom Petruno,
Fears Over Economy Spur Nasdaq Sell-Off, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at C1. The high
prices of technology stocks relative to their earnings (or lack thereof) in 1999 illustrate this
phenomenon.
193. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 867.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 867-68.
197. See id.
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Insider trading may also be beneficial because it provides
corporations with an additional method of communicating and
controlling information. 198 If insiders trade, a company's stock
price will move closer to the point it would have ultimately
reached had the information been disclosed. 199 The more that
market participants are able to identify insider trading, the greater
the quantity of information such trading will convey.2 1
A related advantage of allowing insider trading as a method
to relay information to the financial market is that it may facilitate
smoother transitions in stock prices.20 1 Because insiders typically
comprise a minority of trading volume in any given company, their
stock transactions would gradually drive the market price to
equilibrium as the supply and demand for the stock adjust to the
insiders' trades.21 In contrast, if a release of material information
was not anticipated, public disclosure of this new information
would cause an immediate adjustment in the supply and demand
for the particular stock, creating a potentially drastic spike or dip
in the share price.2 °3 Insider trading can be used to indirectly
convey credible signals to the market,2 4 ultimately avoiding sharp
changes in stock prices that would occur with unanticipated public
disclosure of new information.
3. If Insider Trading Is Inefficient, Let the Market Prevent It
Insider trading arguably constitutes theft, provides inefficient
compensation, destroys investors' confidence, and may simply be
unfair.20 5 On the other hand, "[tihese characterizations just as
aptly describe a hypothetical compensation scheme whereby
managers pay themselves huge salaries and consume unlimited
perquisites, regardless of their productivity." 201 The government
need not prohibit this hypothetical compensation agreement
because competitive markets motivate firms to avoid unprofitable
198. Id. at 868.
199. Id.; MACEY, supra note 15, at 26-27.
200. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 868.
201. SOLOMON ETAL, supra note 155, at 913.
202. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 21, at 135-36.
203. See MACEY, supra note 15, at 26-27.
204. Id. at 46.
205. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 862.
206. Id.
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arrangements.2° The same argument can be applied to insider
trading.2 °8 If insider trading was inefficient, companies that
permitted the practice would be at a competitive disadvantage
compared with firms that prevented it.20 9  As a result, market
forces would drive corporations to create internal measures
prohibiting insider trading.21 °
Several factors may tend to show that, contrary to popular
belief, insider trading may be efficient. First, U.S. firms have,
throughout history, made little attempt to prohibit insider
trading.2 While insider trading was common in the 1920s, the
SEC and federal courts did not aggressively pursue insider trading
convictions until the late 1960s.2 1 2 There is no reason to believe
that between the years of 1920 and 1968 the practice of insider
trading was forgotten2 1 3 -if insider trading was inefficient, firms
would have prevented it.
214
Second, the treatment of insider trading by state law may
illustrate that insider trading is efficient. 215 Because investors seek
companies that have efficient practices, firms are motivated to
incorporate in states that have efficient corporation laws.216
Likewise, because states receive revenues from corporations in the
form of filing fees and taxes, states are motivated to enact
legislation that promotes corporate efficiency. 217 If insider trading
is harmful, therefore, states would have an incentive to outlaw the
practice.218 For the most part, however, state common law has
historically permitted insider trading.
219
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 862-63.
210. See id.
211. Id. at 858.
212. See Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L
REV. 1, 44-46 (1980).
213. See id. at 44.
214. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 858.
215. See id. at 860.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. BARRY ALEXANDER K. RIDER & H. LEIGH FFRENCH, THE REGULATION OF
INSIDER TRADING 99 (1979). The majority common law rule with respect to insider
trading was that directors and officers owed no duty of disclosure to the market as a whole,
and could thus trade on inside information. Id. In the early twentieth century, this rule
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The proposition that insider trading is efficient may be
further supported by the fact that throughout the majority of the
twentieth century, insider trading was either not regulated or
leniently enforced in many foreign countries.22 ° Japan, for
instance, was for many years criticized as being an "insider's
heaven" due to its lack of effective laws and enforcement
mechanisms.221 Insider trading in Japan went largely unregulated
until numerous insider-trading scandals in the 1980s prompted
legislative reform in 1988.222 It was not until 1992, however, that
Japan implemented a regulatory body capable of enforcing its
laws.223 Until 1991, when criminal sanctions and civil remedies
were provided, Hong Kong punished insider trading only by
publication of a report identifying a particular person as an inside
trader.224 France provides an additional example. Insider trading
in French securities markets has been a criminal offense since
1970, but convictions under the regulations were scarce.225 It was
not until 1989, when France empowered its regulatory body to
enforce its own rules, that insider trading began to be effectively
curtailed.226 If insider trading was in fact inefficient, it would seem
was adopted by every state in the United States except for Kansas, Georgia, and
Nebraska. Id.; see, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933) (holding that
directors and officers who use inside information in trading on an impersonal stock
exchange owe no duty of disclosure to the persons with whom they trade). Some states
have since adopted the "special facts doctrine," which asserts that corporate insiders, when
engaging in face-to-face dealings with shareholders, owe a duty of disclosure to
shareholders when the insider conceals his or her identity or fails to disclose material facts.
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 21, at 9. On the other hand, "[ilnsofar as [impersonal] stock
market transactions are concerned... Goodwin apparently [continues to] remain[] the
prevailing view." Id. at 15-16.
220. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 860; see also MACEY, supra note 15, at 44.
221. SHEN-SHIN Lu, INSIDER TRADING AND THE TWENTY-FOUR HOUR SECURITIES
MARKET. A CASE STUDY OF LEGAL REGULATION IN THE EMERGING GLOBAL
ECONOMY 43 (1994).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 44.
224. Raymond Cohen, Hong Kong, in INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING 350 (Mark
Stamp & Carson Welsh eds., 1996).
225. Patricia Peterson, France, in INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING 153 (Mark
Stamp & Carson Welsh eds., 1996); see also RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 219, at 238
(stating that in 1975, five years after the implementation of France's insider trading laws,
the "total number of suits and administrative sanctions [was] nearly nil.").
226. Peterson, supra note 225, at 153.
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that these countries would have prohibited the practice much
sooner.
227
V. GERMAN EQUITY MARKET PERFORMANCE
A look at the performance of German equity markets
provides assistance in determining whether insider trading in fact
harms securities markets. Due to its lack of strict insider trading
laws until 1994,228 Germany presents an interesting analytical
model.
In 1993, the year prior to Germany's enactment of insider
trading regulations, 664 German corporations were listed on the
German stock exchanges and there were nine initial public
offerings (IPOs).22 9 In that same year the total value of stock
trades on German exchanges was $564 billion.230  In contrast,
during 1999, 933 corporations were listed on the German
exchanges, there were 168 IPOs, and trading volume on the
German exchanges reached $1.6 trillion.
231
These figures, however, may be less informative than they
first appear. Equity markets throughout the world virtually
mirrored this growth.232 In the United States, trading volume on
the New York Stock Exchange increased from $22.8 trillion in
1993 to $89.5 trillion in 1999.233 Volume on NASDAQ increased
from $13.5 trillion to $104.7 trillion in the same period.234  The
London Stock Exchange also shared growth similar to that in
Germany during these years, as share volume increased from £564
227. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 860.
228. See discussion supra Part III.A.
229. Deutsche B6rse, listorical Statistics (of German Stock Exchanges): Cash Market,
at http://www.exchange.de/INTERNET/EXCHANGEindex-e.htm (last visited Nov. 21,
2000) [hereinafter Deutsche B6rse]. The number of IPOs, while not as good an indicator
as market volume, is nonetheless an important reflection of investor confidence. See
MACEY, supra note 15, at 9. Investors are willing to pay less for securities traded in an
inefficient or illiquid market. Id. Companies may therefore abstain from issuing stock if
investor confidence in the market is weak, thus bearing the costs associated with investors'
concerns about the market. Id.
230. FIBV, Total Value of Share Trading: Domestic & Foreign, including Investment
Funds, at http://www.fibv.com/stats/ts3.xis (last visited Nov. 25, 2000).
231. Id; Deutsche B6rse, supra note 229.
232. See FIBV, supra note 230.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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billion in 1993 to £1.4 trillion in 1999.235 The quantity of shares
traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange likewise increased from
eighty-seven billion in 1993 to 155 billion in 1999, and IPOs on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange increased from twenty-two in 1993 to
seventy-five in 1999.236
The German markets, therefore, even in view of their upturn
in trading volume, number of publicly traded companies, and
increase in the quantity of IPOs, seem to have merely been a
beneficiary of a global economic up-trend. If so, enactment of
insider trading laws may not have played a significant role in the
development of Germany's equity markets.
VI. CONCLUSION
The insider trading regulations in the United States and
Germany are comprehensive responses to insider trading. While
it is uncertain whether insider trading actually harms securities
markets, recent evidence from Germany and the global securities
markets tends to support the proposition that government
regulation of insider trading may not be necessary. Insofar as
insider trading is efficient, therefore, it might be best to let
regulatory bodies like the SEC detect insider trading and then
refer cases to individual corporations for private litigation. If, at
that point, insider trading proved to be inefficient and such
corporations failed to prosecute perpetrators, competitive markets
would drive firms to prohibit the practice.
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